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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
ROBERT PRICE*
In a society where the individual is increasingly subjected to invasions
of his privacy by governmental units, the Supreme Court recently struck
a blow for freedom. The vehicle for this was the decision in Benanti v.
United States' where a unanimous Court rounded out the areas of exclusion
for wiretap evidence and finally laid to rest the use of any post-1934
wiretaps as sources of evidence in our federal courts.2 In so doing, the
federal judiciary continued its role as protector of the right of privacy
of the individual.
The exclusion of wiretap evidence by our federal courts is in complete
harmony with the federal rule of inadmissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. This federal rule differs from the common law where it has
long been the majority rule that the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which the party has
obtained the evidence. 8
This common law doctrine of admissibility was virtually unchallenged
in our jurisprudence until the opinions of the United States Suprete
*LL.B. 1958, Columbia University; Assistant United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York; Member of New York and Federal Bar. The author
is indebted to Robert Paul, Esq. of Miami for his helpful suggestions.
1. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
2. For related studies of this problem, see Bradley & Hogan, Wire tapping: From
Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GQo. L.J. 418 (1958); Wickershaw, The Supreme
Court and Federal Criminal Procedure, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 14 (1958); W. P. Rogers,
The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954); Donnelly, Comments and
Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799 (1954); Pogue, Wire
Tapping and The Congress, 52 Mica. L. REv. 430 (1954); Westin, The Wire Tapping
Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLw.nr. L. REv. 165 (1952);
Note, Exclusion of Eidence Obtained by Wire Tapping: An Illusory Safeguard, 61
YALE L.J. 1221 (1952); Note, The Coplon Case: Wire tapping, State Secrets and
National Security, 60 YALE L.J. 736 (1951); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping,
32 CORNELL L.Q. 514 (1947); 8 \ViGmOR, EVIODNCE § 2184b (3d ed. 1940). See
also 97 L.Ed 237 (1952) for a collection of federal cases; House Judiciary Committee
Hearings on H.R.REv. No. 2266 and H.R. REv. No. 3099, to authorize wire-tapping,
77th Cong. Ist Sess. (1941); Fairfield & Clift, The Wiretap pers, The Reporter, Dec. 23,
1952, p. 8; Jan. 6, 1953, p. 9. For a compilation of leading works in this area, see The
Record, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 172-5
(March, 1958).
3. Common Law: Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 48 L.Ed. 575 (1904);
Williams v. State, 100 Ca. 511, 28 S.E. 624 (1897). Alabcnna: Jackson v. State,
251 Ala. 226, 36 So.2d (1948). California: People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App.2d 138,
269 P.2d 924 (1954). Idaho: State v. Bond, 12 Ida. 424, 86 Pac. 43 (1906).
Illinois: Chicago v. Di Salvo, 302 I11. 85, 134 N.E. 5 (1922). Louisiana: State v.
Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So.2d 888 (1952). Minnesota: State v. Siporen, 215 Minn.
438, 10 N.W.2d 353 (1943). New York: People v. Richter's Jewelers, 291 N.Y. 161,
51 N.E.2d 69 (1943). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 72
A.2d 575 (1950).
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Court in Boyd v. United States' and Weeks v. United States.5 These
decisions held that the fourth amendment to the Constitution which
prohibited unreasonable search and seizure required adherence so deep and
reverent that any approach to violation of the fourth amendment would
not be approved by the federal courts. Admittedly the rule that evidence
wrongfully obtained may not be used for any purpose is an extraordinary
sanction. However, it is judicially imposed to limit searches and seizures
to those conducted in strict compliance with the fourth amendment.0
Subsequent to these decisions and in consequence of this broad view
taken by the Supreme Court, the problem arose as to whether the inter-
ception of a telephone message, by mechanical or other means, 7 with or
without a warrant for search, was also a violation of the fourth amendment.
This issue was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
Olmstead v. United States.8 In this case a divided Court held admissible
evidence obtained by federal officers through the tapping of telephone
wires. The basis of the decision was that as there was no entry on to the
premises, but rather highway wires were tapped, there was no search or
seizure and, hence, wire tapping did not fall within the prohibitions of
the fourth amendment. The Court indicated that the fourth amendment
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
7. The methods for tapping a wire are of substantial interest. Simply tapping a
wire is a comparatively easy job for any electrician familiar with telephones. Normally,
any repair man cuts in with his headphones regularly as part of his job. Attaching a
recording device is only a little more complex. But to make a secret tap, such as we are
talking about, requires a knowledge of the anatomy of the telephone system, plus certain
confidential information about the particular phone to be tapped.
In a rural area this anatomy is very simple, on open poles quite exposed to
trespassers. In rural areas also, where party lines are still used, anyone talking on a
telephone is aware that some neighbor may be listening. It is in the big cities, where
big telephone cables run underground, that we have developed the concept of telephone
privacy. Yet it requires only a few facts to understand the vulnerability of this complex
metropolitan system.
Each telephone has its own pair of electrical conductors, which is connected
to a cable containing many such pairs. '[his connection is made at a junction box,
known as a feeder box or bridging point, in which each pair is attached to exposed
terminals, identified by number. Each cable has several of these bridging points. They
vary from large panels in office buildings to relatively small boxes attached to walls
in back yards. Few of these are locked and they are readily accessible for tampering
by the man who knows what it is about.
To tap a phone in a big city, the tapper needs to know the pair and cable
numbers for that phone, and the location of the cable's various bridging points, lie
can tap at any bridging point, or he may merely make a cross-connection to another,
unused pair in another cable. Then, at sonic bridging point of this unused pair, he
can attach his tapping wires at a place where they may be easily run to a secret"plant," in which the earphones or recording machine can be set up for monitoring
all calls on the tapped telephone. State of New York, Report of the New York State
Joint Legislative Committee to Study Illegal Interception of Communications, p. 20
(Legislative I)ocument No. 53, 1956).
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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appeared to be concerned only where the search was of material things-
the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.9
In the case of wiretapping thcre is no searching and no seizure. Evidence
is obtained only by the use of the sense of hearing and that alone. The
Court reasoned that the intervening wires were not part of the house any
more than are the highways along which they are situated. The Court
stated:
Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages
by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in
federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from
the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such
a policy by attributing a large and unusual meaning to the Fourth
Amendment.10
Thus, up until the time that Congress acted in 1934, the legal status
of wiretapping was easily defined: it was neither unconstitutional nor a
federal crime and evidence obtained by intercepting telephone conversations
was admissible" in federal courts. 12
Evidently public disapproval greeted this opinion of the Supreme Court
because from 1928 to 1934 several bills were introduced into the Congress. 13
Finally in 1934, Congress enacted The Communications Act of 1934,14
particularly section 605, which reads in part:
9. This limitation of the fourth amendment is apparently still good law today.
See United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 351
U.S. 916 (1956); United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Stpp. 838 (D.D.C. 1958).
10. 277 U.S. at 465-6.
11. This doctrine was followed in Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d I, 4 (5th Cir.
1933), where the court stated: "lit is settled . . . that (wiretapping) . . . does not
require the discarding of the information secured."
12. Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933); Kerns v. United
States, 50 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1931).
13. Three years before the enactment of § 605, Congress had failed to pass
several bills forbidding wiretapping and excluding from federal courts evidence obtained
thereby. 1.R. REP. No. 23, H.R. REP. No. 5305, S. REP. No. 1396, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1931); H.R. RE.P. No. 9893, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). In 1933 an
appropriations bill provided that none of the funds thereby appropriated should be
used for wiretapping to procure evidence of violation of the National Prohibition Act.
47 Stat. 1381 (1933).
It seems unlikely that only one year later a bill known to affect so controversial
a subject could pass without comment. Possibly, therefore, Congress passed § 605
without intending it to apply to telephone communications. However, the words,
"communication by wire,' as used in other sections, appear to include telephone
communication. Thus, the plain meaning of the statute appears to require application
of its prohibition to private wiretapping. However, in view of the established canon
that a general statute need not be construed to bind the government, it would seem
to have been unnecessary to apply the section to governmental wiretapping. But the
courts have so done. Note, The Benanti Case: State Wiretap Evidence and The Federal
Exclusionary Rule, 57 COLUM. L. Rev. 1159 (1957).
14. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. 1958). "While
the legislative history of § 605 is obscure, it would be unrealistic not to recognize that
one of its prime purposes was to overcome the force of the Olmstead case ... " United
States v. Hill, 149 F.Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). For a discussion upholding the
constitutionality of this section see Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957).
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[Njo person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communi-
cation to any person ...
This act made wiretapping a criminal offense.'
An important distinction should be mentioned here. This act does not
destroy the use of wiretap evidence in the federal courts. It simply makes
wiretapping a crime.'6 The courts, by way of enforcing this statute, refuse
to allow the fruits of this crime, namely wiretap evidence, to be used in
the federal courts. Hence, were wiretapping not a crime the evidence
probably could be used. Therefore, any evidence obtained by the use of
wiretaps, before wiretapping became a federal crime, is admissible as
evidence in the federal courts. This proposition is illustrated infra.
Soon after the enactment of the act the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to interpret section 605. In Nardone v. United States, 7 the
indictment charged the defendants with smuggling alcohol in violation
of the Anti-Smuggling Act. They were tried, convicted and sentenced.
Over the defendants' objections, federal agents testified to the substance
of petitioners' interstate communications. The agents had overheard these
conversations when they intercepted the messages by tapping telephone
wires. The appellate court had sustained the conviction, and on appeal
the Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court held that evidence secured by federal officers in
violation of this statute was inadmissible in federal courts. The Court
apparently was not bothered by the lack of any apparent congressional
intent in section 605 to fomulate an evidentiary rule. Mr. Justice Roberts
expressed his belief that the act prevented intercepting telephone conversa-
tion. He apparently saw no reason to permit evidence obtained by this
criminal act to be admitted in federal court. The Nardone decision referred
to the Olmstead' s case and implied that soction 605 was meant to correct
a situation which Congress felt should not exist. Justice Roberts said the
statute forbade any intcrception, and this included interception by govern-
ment agents.
15. Section 501 of The Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1100, as
amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 501 (Supp. 1958), provides criminal sanctions for wiretaps
made in violation of § 605. However, though violations of § 605 by police officers have
often been revealed in court, the only prosecutions under § 501 appear to be against
private citizens. See United States v. Cris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957); Reitmaster v.
Reitmaster, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307
(2d Cir. 1941).
16. To constitute the crime there must be both an interception and a divulgence.
See United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1950) (dictum p. 871),
reversed on other grounds, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
17. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Cf. United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1938); United States v. Reed, 96 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1938).
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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In the second trial of the same accused the Court widened its inter-
pretation to include barring any evidence obtained even indirectly from
information resulting from wiretapping.' 9 In this case the Court stated:
The issue thus tendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals is the
broad one, whether or no[t] § 605 merely interdicts the intro-
duction into evidence in a federal trial of intercepted telephone
conversations, leaving the prosecution free to make every other
use of the proscribed evidence. Plainly, this presents a far-reaching
problem in the administration of federal criminal justice ...
We are here dealing with specific prohibition of particular methods
in obtaining evidence. The result of the holding below is to reduce
the scope of § 605 to exclusion of the exact words heard through
forbidden interceptions, allowing these interceptions every deriva-
tive use that they may serve. Such a reading of § 605 would
largely stultify the policy which compelled our decision in Nardone
v. United States, supra. That decision was not the product of a
merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the
translation into practicality of broad considerations of morality and
public well-being. This Court found that the logically relevant
proof which Congress had outlawed, it outlawed because 'incon-
sistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'
302 U.S. 379, 383. To forbid the direct use of methods thus
characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect use would
only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty.' What was said in
a different context in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392, is pertinent here: 'The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
court, but that it shall not be used at all .....
Here . . . the facts improperly obtained do not 'become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an inde-
pendent source they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be
used by it' simply because it is used derivatively. 251 U.S. 385,
392.20
Basically, the Nardone cases interpreted section 605 to say that any
wiretap evidence obtained by federal agents is inadmissible in federal
courts, not because of the rules of evidence but apparently because wire-
tapping was a violation of law - and the courts were not disposed to
allow .one guilty of such violations to use the fruits of the crime, i.e., the
evidence.
The coverage of the statute was further broadened in Weiss v. United
States,21 an action wherein petitioners were indicted for using the mails and
19. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Cf. United States v. Costello,
171 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
20. 308 U.S. at 339-41.
21. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
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for conspiracy. On the issue of whether the defendants had guilty knowledge,
the Government introduced evidence of wiretaps. Petitioners objected on
the grounds that the introduction of this evidence violated section 605.
The Government contended that the act applied only to interstate
communications. The Court rejected this contention and held that
section 605 applied to intrastate as well as to interstate communications.22
This decision was based upon the policy underlying the majority view
in the first Nardone case.
Subsequent to the Nardone decisions the courts limited the statute's
sweep in two cases. In Goldman v. United States 3 the Supreme Court
held that the placing of a detectaphone against a wall in such a manner
as to enable federal officers to overhear telephone conversations in the
next room, did not constitute "an interception" prohibited by the statute
and said that it was merely analogous to a person overhearing a conversa-
tion in the same room. This was a conspiracy under the Bankruptcy Act
and in order to overhear conversations two federal agents obtained access
to the office of the defendant and installed a dictaphone in the partition
wall, with ear-phones in the adjoining room. This instrument failed to
work so they placed a more delicate instrument against the wall and were
thus able to overhear conversations between the accused and another
party which a stenographer recorded. The Court held that under the
Communications Act, section 605, there was neither a "communication"
nor "interception" during the course of transmission.
Perhaps the most severe limitation on the use of the statute was
enunciated in Goldstein v. United States,2'- which apparently held that
one not a party to the intercepted conversation had io standing to object
to the divulging of its contents. This was a mail fraud and conspiracy to
present false insurance claims and some of the conspirators had confessed
and were ready to turn state's evidence. It appeared that this was due
to their being confronted with telephone messages alleged to have been
unlawfully obtained by wiretapping under section 605. The Court held
that their testimony was admissible, even assuming the illegality of the
wiretapping, and the divulgence of the intercepted messages as the induce-
ment to the confessions since the witnesses had not been parties to the
illegality. This decision was apparently based on a technicality, namely
that the statute authorized only the sender to consent to interceptions
22. Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 909 (1957); United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 351 U.S. 916
(1956); United States v. Lipinski, 151 F. Supp. 145 (D. N.M. 1957), affirmed, 251
F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1958).
23. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
24. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
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and therefore only he was entitled to its protection. 25 Thus, these two
decisions remain as the two prime attempts of the courts to curb the
broad interpretation of the Nardone construction,
Another technicality exists as to the meaning of the word "intercept."
As to wiretapping and related matters, the key sentence of this act says
"no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish" its existence or contents. Several federal
courts have interpreted this differently when one party to a telephone
conversation consented to a recording.
In the case of United States v. Yee Ping Jong,26 the defendant appealed
a federal narcotic conviction, contending that recording of a conversation
betweenu himself and a treasury informer was improperly received in
evidence. The informer had made the call at the direction of a federal
officer. In overruling this contention the court held that such a recording
was not an "interception" as contemplated by section 605.27
A contrary result has been reached in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In an opinion written by Judge Learned Hand and con-
curred in by Judge Augustus N. Hand the court held that the act of an
F.B.I. agent who recorded telephone conversations upon a machine attached
to a telephone extension, with the consent of one of the parties to the
conversation, was nevertheless an interception, and within the prohibition
of section 605.28 Similarly it has been held that the recording of a telephone
conversation by one of the parties was a violation of section 605, requiring
that evidence obtained thereby be suppressed.29
25. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a violation of the narcotic
laws, the Court held that evidence obtained by an undercover agent who engaged
the defendant in an incriminating conversation which was transmitted to the witness
by a receiver tuned to a microphone hidden on the person of the agent was admissible.
In Diamond v. United States, 108 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1938) the court held that
§ 605 prohibited all interception by wiretapping except by persons authorized by the
sender to so do, See also United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940), wherein each participant in a telephone conversation
is regarded as a "sender".
26. 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939). For an interesting article dealing with
recordings see Kupferman, Rights In New Media, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 172 (1954).
27. Accord: United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir, 1956); Billeci v.
United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Pierce, 124 F. Sutpp. 264
(N.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd. without opinion, 224 F.2d 281 (6th Gir. 1955); United
States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953). See also Flanders v. United
States, 222 F.2d 163, 167 (6th Cir. 1955) wherein McAllister, C.J., stated, "where,
by means of an extension phone, or other device, a third party 'listens in' on a
telephone conversation with the consent of one of the parties . . . there is no interception
of the communication within the meaning of the statute."
28. Accord: James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Reitinaster v.
Reitmaster, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940); United States v. Hill, 149 F. Stpp.
83 (SD.N.Y, 1957).
29. United States v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (1). D.C. 1954) (section 605
is generally restricted to devices reqiring physical contact with the telephone system),
See Rayson v. United States, 238 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956); Billeci v. United, States,
184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838
(D. D.C. 1958); United States v. Guller, 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
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This problem was in large part resolved by the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Rathbun v. United States, wherein the Supreme Court resolved
an important conflict in this area when it ruled that section 605 was
not violated when a person listened in on a telephone conversation via
an extension telephone, if this was done with the consent of one of the
parties. This case concerned the issue of whether the contents of a com-
munication overheard on a regularly used telephone extension with the
consent of one party to the conversation was admissible in federal court.
Police officers had listened to a conversation on a telephone extension.
The extension had not been installed there for this purpose but was a
regular connection, normally used. At the trial of the sender of the
message, over objections, the police testified as to the contents of the
telephone conversation. The defendant was convicted and the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court, per Warren, C.J., stated:
Since there was a divulgence of the contents of a communication,
the only issue on the facts before us is whether there has been
an unauthorized interception within the meaning of Section 605.
The federal courts have split in their determination on this
question. Some courts have held that the statute proscribes the
use of an extension telephone to allow someone to overhear a
conversation without the consent of both parties. Others have
concluded that the statute is inapplicable where one party has
consented. We hold that Section 605 was not violated in the
case before us because there has been no "interception" as Congress
intended that the word be used. Every statute must be interpreted
in the light of reason and common understanding to reach the
results intended by the legislature ...
The telephone extension is a widely used instrument of home
and office, yet with nothing to evidence congressional intent,
petitioner argues that Congress meant to place a severe restriction
on its ordinary use by subscribers, denying them the right to
allow a family member, an employee, a trusted friend, or even the
police to listen to a conversation to which a subscriber is a party.
Section 605 points to the opposite conclusion ...
For example, it follows from petitioner's argument that every
secretary who listens to a business conversation at her employer's
direction in order to record it would be marked as a potential
federal criminal. It is unreasonable to believe that Congress meant
to extend criminal liability to conduct which is wholly innocent
and ordinary.
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone
number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily
used instrumcnt. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the
risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and
30. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one clement of Section 605,
interception, has not occurred.3 '
In 1952 the Supreme Court seemed to remove all doubt of whether
section 605 applied to state as well as federal court proceedings? 2 Mr.
Justice Minton, speaking for the majority, assumed that a violation of
section 605 had occurred, but held that though Nardone had made
wiretap evidence inadmissible in federal courts it did not compel a rule
of inadmissibility in state courts.
Thus, as of 1957 the status of the law was fairly clear. Because
wiretapping was a crime the courts would not encourage the crime and
therefore would not allow its use in the federal courts. The courts had
interpreted section 605 to exclude the direct or indirect use of wiretap
evidence in the federal courts but had said that they were without power
to stop it in the state courts. The prohibition was subject to some limita-
tions, as in Goldman3 and Goldstein,3 but these were technical rather
than substantive.
In 1957 the Supreme Court addressed itself to the status of wiretap
evidence obtained by state officials under proper laws of their respective
states, and the subsequent introduction of that evidence in a federal
court. Under the theory that wiretap evidence was not admitted in federal
court because it was the fruit of a crime, it would follow that if wiretap
evidence were done lawfully then it would not be the fruit of a crime and
should be admitted in court. Section 605 apparently had not been applied
to state officers and they, so long as wiretapping was lawful within their
state, could wiretap, subject to certain limited restrictions which varied in
each state.
In order to prevent lawfully obtained wiretap evidence from being
introduced in the federal courts, the Supreme Court would have had to
reach the conclusion that section 605 either introduced an evidentiary
rule or was intended to affect state officers in the federal courts. In Benanti
v. United States3- the Supreme Court met the issue squarely and held that
.section 605 applied to everyone, including state officers, and that the
Congress did not intend to allow state legislation which would contradict
section 605 and the public policy underlying it.a5
31. 355 U.S. at 108-11.
32. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). See also Commonwealth v. Chaitt,
380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955), Cf., People
v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E.2d 141 (1948), aff'd without opinion, 336 U.S.
963 (1949). Thirty-eight states have statutes which limit the use of wiretapping, only
two expressly forbid disclosure; the rest either allow wiretap evidence to be used at will
or exempt public officers from compliance, The statutes are summarized in the report
of the New York State foint Legislative Committee to Study Illegal Interception of
Communications. (N.Y. Legis. Doe. No. 53, 1956).
33. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
34. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
35. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
19591
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In Benanti, police officers of the City of New York established a
wiretap, as authorized by New York law, in order to obtain evidence
that petitioner and others were violating state narcotic laws. Acting upon
information secured by the wiretap, the city police stopped and searched
an automobile driven by petitioner's brother, and discovered that he was
transporting alcohol without the tax stamps required by federal law.
No narcotics were found. The federal officers were notified and a prosecu-
tion in a United States District Court ensued. Petitioner's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained by the wiretap was denied, and he was
convicted. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the conviction
and on certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed, and held
unanimously, that evidence obtained as a result of wiretapping by state
law enforcement officers, though acting pursuant to state law, and without
participation by federal authorities, was inadmissible in a federal criminal
prosecution.
What apparently was behind the Court's reasoning was the fact that
the very nature of a telephone communication was a property right
intended to be protected and that there was too strong a public policy
seeking to protect it to allow section 605 to be overridden by a state
law. The Court stated:
Respondent does not urge that, constitutionally speaking, Congress
is without power to forbid such wiretapping even in the face of a
conflicting state law. . . . Rather the argument is that Congress
has not exercised this power and that Section 605, being general
in its terms, should not be deemed to operate to prevent a State
from authorizing wiretapping in the exercise of its legitimate police
functions. However, we read the Federal Communications Act, and
Section 605 in particular, to the contrary.
The Federal Communications Act is a comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of interstate communications. In order to safeguard
those interests protected under Section 605, that portion of the
statute pertinent to this case applies both to intrastate and to
interstate communications... . The natural result of respondent's
argument is that both interstate and intrastate communication
would be removed from the statute's protection because, as this
Court noted in Weiss, the intercepter cannot disccrn between the
two and will listen to both. Congress did not intend to place
the protections so plainly guaranteed in Section 605 in such a
vulnerable position. Respondent points to portions of the Act
which place some limited authority in the States over the field
of interstate communication. The character of these matters,
dealing with aspects of the regulation of utility service to the
public, is technical in nature in contrast to the broader policy
considerations motivating Section 605. Moreover, the very existence
of these grants of authority to the States underscores the conclu-
sion that had Congress intended to allow the States to make
exceptions to Section 605, it would have said so. In light of the
abovc considerations, and keeping in mind this comprehensive
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scheme of iuterstate regulation and the public policy underlying
Section 605 as part of that scheme, we find that Congress,
setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow
state legislation which would contradict that section and that
policy. . ... 10
By virtue of this decision the Court apparently has denied admission
of any wiretap evidence in a federal court regardless of its origin. It
should be noted, however, that section 605 does not make wiretapping
per se an offense; it is the interception and divulgence of the contents
of the message which constitutes the crime and both elements are
essential to complete the offense.
Also, worthy of mention is the fact that since section 605 makes
evidence obtained by intercepting telephone communications inadmissible
in federal courts, leads obtained by wiretapping may not be utilized
by the prosecution. The fact that wires wcre tapped does not vitiate
a criminal prosecution if the Government can establish to the court's
satisfaction that its proof at the trial had an origin independent of
wiretapping.37 This pre-trial procedure, wherein the court, outside the
hearing of the jury, decides whether the Government has independent
means of proving the charge, is usually known as a "Nardone hearing."
An area still unresolved by the United States Supreme Court is
the extent the indirect use of wiretapping, beyond a mere lead, approaches
the exclusionary area. This unresolved area is best illustrated by an
example. Suppose the police authorities (P) suspect Mr. X of being
connected with Crime A. Pursuant to state law P wiretaps X's telephone.
They find sufficient information about Crime A to present to an indicting
body, X is brought before that body and, in the course of his several
hours of testimony, facts unrelated to Crime A are discovered. The
extent of the exclusionary rule as applied to these facts, which are
irrelevant to the original Crime A is the subject of an unresolved area
in the law.
This problem has two aspects. If the inadvertently discovered facts
were first discussed in a telephone conversation which was wiretapped,
then, even though unrelated to Crime A it seems clear that under the
drift of present court doctrine this incidental information is excluded
from presentation in federal courts. However, suppose this additional or
inadvertently discovered information has no basis in the wiretapped
conversation, but is merely placed upon the record by X. Hearing these
inadvertent facts another governmental agency uses these leads for an
eventual prosecution in the federal courts. Is this subsequent prosecution
tainted because it is remotely connected to another crime about which there
36. 355 U.S. at 104-6.
37. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Sullivan v. United States,
219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 756
(D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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were wiretaps? While it has some connection with wiretap, it appears
absurd to taint the subsequent prosecution with the earmarks of wiretap.
If this taint were applied then Mr. X could create an immunity as to all
prior crimes which lie has committed simply by mentioning them and
placing them on the record in a hearing directly stemming from wire-
tapping. The courts evidently intended an exclusionary rule applying to
evidence obtained both directly and indirectly from wiretapping. However,
to extend this rule to a remote and unconnected fact which is inadvertently
uncovered during a tainted investigation is to give Mr. X an immunity
not intended by any court.
In the second Frank Costello denaturalization proceeding 8 the court
in a clear and scholarly opinion attempted to delineate and limit some
absurd effects of the exclusionary rule. In this case the facts disclosed that
in 1943 the District Attorney of New York County, acting upon information
clearly mingled with wiretapping evidence went before a New York County
grand jury and questioned Costello about certain matters unrelated to
the subject in the wiretaps, and in some instances only remotely related
to any pertinent phase of the grand jury investigation. In one of these
forays into the land beyond the grand jury investigative purpose, Costello
admitted that he had been engaged in bootlegging in the period preceding
his naturalization. This information was not elicited by the use of
wiretapping information but was voluntarily advanced in response to a
question by his own attorney. On the trial of this denaturalization action
Costello's attorney maintained that this admission of bootlegging activity
in 1943 was tainted evidence and could not be admitted in evidence
sixteen years later. This contention was rejected by the court, per Dawson,
J., stating:
The proposition of the defendant seems to be that because the
investigation was precipitated by an intercepted telephone con-
versation on a purely collateral matter, nothing he said about his
criminal activities in other fields could thereafter be used. This
would extend the principle of the second Nardone case far beyond
what the Court determined. It would mean that a man whose
telephone had been tapped would be granted immunity for any
admissions which he thereafter made, not in the telephone
conversations but in answer to any questions in a later investigation.
There is no basis for extending the rule to this degree.
Another important issue still unresolved by the Supreme Court is
a determination as to whether or not a pre-1934 wiretap is admissible in
federal courts. The better rule is that it is admissible based upon the
fact that since no rule of evidence excludes wiretap evidence and that
it is excluded solely because it is the fruit of a crime created in 1934
it therefore follows that such evidence obtained prior to 1934, being
not criminal, is, of course, admissible. This view was propounded by the
38. United States v. Costello, 171 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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Second Circuit in the first United States v. Costello case,39 wherein
Clark, C.J. stated:
We have also considered whether the decision can be sustained
on the ground that, as shown by the record, the government's
evidence was by and large inadmissible. We hold that no such
demonstration was made. Wire tapping in 1925 and 1926 allegedly
produced the defendant's prosecution in the latter year. The
fruit of such tapping was spread on the public record at the
open trial for bootlegging. We do not construe § 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605, to render it a
crime to republish information which was lawfully intercepted
and divulged once before prior to that Act's passage. The fruit
of any 1925-26 taps is admissible. .. 40
Thus, at present, any evidence obtained by wiretaps since 1934,
whether by state or federal officers, is inadmissible in the federal courts.
41
This does not mean that in a case where there is wiretap evidence a
conviction cannot stand, because if there is evidence emanating from
areas other than wiretaps the conviction can stand on those grounds alone.
As a practical matter the objecting party has the burden of showing
that his wire was tapped. 42 Once he does so the prosecution must show
that the tap did not lead to the evidence introduced.
43
Wiretapping is difficult to prove and mere circumstantial evidence
on the part of the complainant which falls short of "solidity" and "lacks
definiteness" is insufficient to grant a hearing on the wiretapped evidence.
44
This demonstrates a weakness of the Nardone rule. A complaining party
needs solid evidence of wiretapping and such information becomes available
to him only if the Government has been careless.
In the second Nardone case 45 the Court spoke of the burden on the
defendant, as follows:
The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to
prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wiretapping was unlaw-
fully employed. Once that is established- as was plainly done
here - the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely
confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of
the case aginst him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This
leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the
trial court that its proof had an independent origin.46
39. 247 F.2d 384 (2d. Cir. 1957), reversed on other grounds, 356 U.S. 256 (1958).
40. 247 F.2d at 387.
41. The rule of wiretap evidence being inadmissible in federal court has been
applied to federal officers testifying in state court prosecutions. See Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
42. United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F.Supp. 934, 939 (D.Md. 1951).
43. United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950), cert denied, 342
U.S. 920 (1952).
44. United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp, 934 (D. Md. 1951).
45. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
46. 308 U.S. at 341,
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From this language the conclusion would appear that the party
seeking to suppress the use of evidence on the ground of wiretap must
show more than the mere existence of wiretaps at some time. He must
show further that some substantial part of the case has been derived
from wiretaps.'
It appears that the current state of the exclusionary rule in the federal
courts is clear. A defendant who was a party to a call may move to
have the court suppress the contents, and any evidence obtained directly
or indirectly therefrom. This prohibition extends to both interstate and
intrastate calls overheard by anyone, so long as the listening in was
without the pemlission of the other party to the call.
Repeated efforts have been made in recent years to permit a degree
of wiretapping by federal law enforcement officers. The conclusion as to
whether or not the law should be relaxed must come from the results of
a process of weighing the equities. Admittedly the present federal law
hinders enforcement officers. Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.,
in a thought provoking and informative discussion of the apparent need
for wiretapping in certain areas, has stated, 48
Re-evaluation of the critical situation today makes it clear
that authorized wire tapping under careful restrictions in cases
involving our national security is not 'dirty business' at all,
but a common sense solution by Congress which will protect
the liberty and security of all the people from those who wish
to see it impaired.
Prior to the invention of the telephone and telegraph, you
could track a criminal down by shadowing him and checking
his contacts. These days, most spies, traitors, and espionage
agents are usually far too clever and devious in their operations
to allow themselves to be caught walking down the street with
their accomplices. Trailing them or trapping them is difficult
unless you can tap their messages. Convicting thcm is practically
impossible unless you can use these wiretaps in court. And it
is, of course, too late to do anything about it after sabotage,
assassinations and 'fifth column' activities are completed. . .
Some opponents to wire tapping also claim that they are con-
47. In United States v. Goldstein, 120 1.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941), affirmed,
316 U.S. 114 (1942), Judge land referred to the language of the Supreme Court as
quoted above and stated at page 488, 'That language canmot indeed serve as a ruling
that the prosecution has the burden to show how far its proof has 'an independent
origin,' but it is consonant with that position, and to soei extent suggests it. In any
event it appears to us that this should be the rule in analogy to the well settled doctrine
in civil eases that a wrongdoer who has mingled the consequences of lawful and
unlawful conduct, has the burden of disentangling them and must bear the prejudice
of his failure to do so; that is, that it is unfair to throw upon the innocent party the
duty of unravelling the skein which the guilty party has snarled." See also United
States v. Coplori, 185 F.2d 629 (Zd Cir. 1950).
48. Brownell, 'he Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNYLL L. Q. 195,
205 (1954). See also Brown & Peer, The Wiretapping Entanglement: How to Strengthen
Law Enforcement and 'Preserve Privacy, 44 CORN I.L L. Q. 175 (1959).
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cerned with the protection of innocent persons who through
no fault of their own may have become enmeshed with spies
and subversives. This argument has no real validity. . . . No
innocent person would be hurt by legislation authorizing wire-
taps to be admissible against our internal enemies . -.
However, allowing enforcement officers to tap wires merely with the
approval of one member of the judiciary appears to be too insecure a
safeguard. 49 If we are to permit invasions of privacy under the guise
of law enforcement, we must adequately insure certain minimal standards.
Any proposed legislation in the federal area should provide that at least
three judges should approve any petition for wiretapping. This may
mean that the Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit would have
to approve the application. This, at best, is a minimal safeguard.
Arguments against permitting any wiretapping are of interest. Justice
Frankfurter has stated:50
Suppose it be true that through 'dirty business' it is easier for
prosecutors and police to bring an occasional criminal to heel.
It is most uncritical to assume that unless the Government is
allowed to practicc 'dirty business' crime would become rampant or
would go unpunished ...
My deepest feeling against giving legal sanction to such 'dirty
business' as the record in this case discloses is that it makes for
lazy and not alert law enforcement. It puts a premium on force
and fraud, not on imagination and enterprise and professional
training. The third degree, search without warrant, wiretapping
and the like, were not tolerated in what was probably the most
successful administration in our time of the busiest United
States Attorney's office. This experience under Henry L. Stimson
in the Southern District of New York, compared with happen-
ings elsewhere, doubtless planted in me a deep conviction that
these short-cuts in the detection and prosecution of crime are
as self-defeating as they are immoral,
Against this approach is the apparent necessity for aiding law enforce-
ment within proper bounds. The status of the law at present is closely
in line with the rules preferred by Justice Frankfurter. Any changes
in these rules are within the province of the Congress; the courts have
had their say.
49. This is the procedure followed in states such as New York. See N. Y. CONST.
art. I, § 12 (1954); N, Y. CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 813a (1942).
50. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 760-1 (1952) (dissent).
